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I. INTRODUCTION
As our country struggles with returning to normalcy
after the difficulties inflicted by the novel coronavirus, COVID19, lawsuits are beginning to originate throughout the fifty
states, at least in part, from repercussions associated with the
outbreak. With companies just starting to reopen their doors,
some experts believe that tort lawyers are readying clients to
file lawsuits claiming lost wages and medical costs associated
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with contracting the disease while in a person’s employment.2
The possibility of wrongful death lawsuits initiating from the
cruise ship industry is a valid concern as well. Indeed, an April
23, 2020, Miami Herald article reported at least seventy-six
deaths related to the industry.3 The list of potential cases is
endless. There are nursing home industry fatalities;
employment issues for back pay; commercial real estate leases
broken by once-profitable companies; and criminal charges for
breaking stay-at-home orders. The list goes on and on.
Ultimately, should these cases be brought to trial, jurors
will decide their fate. But, as with any proceeding, the parties’
ability to obtain a fair trial is paramount. Many mechanisms
have been put in place to guarantee this protection. One in
particular is the use of change of venue requests. Lawyers who
believe that it is impossible to select a fair jury from a particular
location may seek this unusual remedy hoping to have their
case transferred to a different locale to ensure fairness and
impartiality. Typically, these requests are made in high profile
cases when an overabundance of media attention has tainted
the jury pool. But other examples also exist. Changes of venue
have occurred either because a party employed several
individuals in a town, or a community was significantly
impacted by a defendant’s misdeeds.
This article attempts to determine the validity of change
of venue requests for COVID-19 related cases in “hot spots”
where the disease has been extremely prevalent or deadly. The
hypothesis is that these locations will have a greater potential
for jurors to be tainted because it will be unlikely that enough
potential jurors will be affected from the repercussions of the
disease. It will begin by tracing the history of change of venue
motions to determine the rationale behind their use. Next,
examples will be provided of successful and unsuccessful
change of venue requests to determine how the courts will
decide when the remedy is appropriate versus when it is not.
Amanda Bronstad, As Businesses Reopen, Lawsuits Loom Over
COVID-19-19 Exposure, LAW.COM (May 1, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/2020/05/01/as-businesses-reopen-lawsuitsloom-over-covid-19-exposure/.
3 Sarah Blaskey, et al., COVID-19 Cruises, How Many Coronavirus Cases
Have Been Linked to Cruises? Check Out the Latest Numbers, MIAMI
HERALD (April 23, 2020, 12:01 PM, UPDATED May 15, 2020, 02:31
PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourismcruises/article241914096.html.
2

CHANGE OF VENUE IN COVID-19 “HOT SPOTS”

231

Based on this analysis, the article will then attempt to predict
the general likelihood that these requests will be successful in
COVID-19 related cases.
The document’s ultimate goal is to provide guidance on
if and how these challenges should be made. As of the writing
of this article, the United States is approaching nearly five
million confirmed cases of the disease.4 It is predicted that by
December, 2020, our country will see three hundred thousand
Americans lose their lives because of the illness.5 At its peak,
the unemployment rate hit 14.7%--numbers not seen since the
Great Depression.6 There is no doubt that COVID-19 has
infiltrated every part of society. Most courts have been closed
for months, and as such, they have halted the filing of new
claims. But the keys to the courthouse cannot be withheld
forever. It is only a matter of time before the flood gates open.
II. HISTORY BEHIND CHANGE OF VENUE
The right to a fair and impartial jury in a specific venue
is fundamental to our country’s jurisprudence. The protection
is guaranteed to every litigant by the Federal Constitution. For
instance, the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .”7 The privilege is extended to certain civil cases
by the Seventh Amendment.8 And while an argument can be
made that these rights have been extended to state proceedings
through the Fourteenth Amendment, many states have taken it

CDC COVID-19 DATA TRACKER,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/casesupdates/cases-in-us.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
5 Cecilia Smith-Schoenwalder, Key Model Predicts Nearly 300,000
Coronavirus Deaths by December, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORTS
(Aug. 6, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthnews/articles/2020-08-06/key-model-predicts-nearly-300-000coronavirus-deaths-by-december.
6 THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—AUGUST 2020,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (last visited
Oct. 6, 2020).
7 U.S.CONST. amend. VI.
8 U.S.CONST. amend. VII.
4
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upon themselves to assert similar guarantees in their state
constitutions.9
In Florida, for instance, the right to a specific venue and
an impartial jury in criminal cases can be found in Article I
Section 16.10 The text of the document states that all criminal
defendants will be tried by a fair jury,
. . . in the county where the crime was
committed. If the county is not known, the
indictment or information may charge venue in
two or more counties conjunctively and proof
that the crime was committed in that area shall
be sufficient; but before pleading the accused
may elect in which of those counties the trial will
take place. Venue for prosecution of crimes
committed beyond the boundaries of the state
shall be fixed by law.11
Section 22 of the Florida Constitution also grants this
same right to litigants in civil cases.12 However, Florida is not
alone in extending this privilege to its citizens. In Maine, the
state constitution employs the word “vicinity” in defining
where an impartial jury should be selected from.13 Other states
such as Montana and Minnesota utilize the word “district” in
characterizing venue.14 And, in West Virginia, the term
“vicinage” is applied.15
Some states go to great pains to recognize the
relationship between venue and a fair jury.16 The Alabama
Constitution, for example, explicitly safeguards the connection
between the two concepts.17 Specifically, the section regarding
due process in the state constitution reads:
[T]he legislature may, by a general law, provide
for a change of venue at the instance of the
U.S.CONST. amend. XIV.
FLA. CONST. art I. §. 16.
11 Id.
12 FLA. CONST. art I. § 22.
13 ME. CONST. art I. § 6.
14 MONT. CONST. art. II. § 24; MINN. CONST. art. I.§ 6.
15 W.VA. CONST. art 1. § 8.
16 ALA. CONST. art. I. § 6.
17 Id.
9
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defendant in all prosecutions by indictment, and
such change of venue, on application of the
defendant, may be heard and determined
without the personal presence of the defendant
so applying therefor; provided, that at the time
of the application for the change of venue . . . .18
The Arkansas Constitution also acknowledges the
interplay between the two concepts by specifically mentioning
a defendant’s right to change venue to receive a fair trial in
Article II.19
One of the earliest notations regarding the importance
of venue and a fair jury can be found in England from 1856
when their Parliament passed a law known as the Central
Criminal Court Act.20 This was later called the Palmer Act after
the notorious defendant in the case, Dr. William Palmer.21 In
1855, Dr. Palmer, also known as the “Prince of Poisoners,” was
tried for the murder of his friend, John Cook.22 Allegations
against the doctor focused on the victim being poisoned by
strychnine.23
Before the trial occurred, Palmer raised a concern that
he could not be tried by an impartial jury in the town of
Staffordshire, where the murder had occurred.24 The case had
received a high degree of notoriety in the press and
newspapers.25 At one point, it was reported that Palmer’s wife
and four children had previously died under mysterious
circumstances from poisoning.26 In response to his concern, the
English Parliament passed a law that allowed any crime
committed outside of London to be tried at the Old Bailey

Id.
ARK. CONST. art. II § 10.
20 Noah Feldman, Can Boston Strong be Boston Fair?, LOWELL SUN (Jan.
11, 2015),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:
contentItem:5F23-36H1-DYT4-V08M-00000-00&context=1516831.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
18
19
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Courthouse,27 which had served as London’s central criminal
courthouse since 1674.28
Ultimately, Palmer was convicted and then later
executed.29 But the infamy of the proceeding drew attention
from the United States.30 Initially, the British decision was met
with trepidation.31 The phrase “wherein the crime shall have
been committed,” found in the Sixth Amendment, was a direct
response to a worry that a powerful central government would
unfairly try people away from their homes.32 Yet, as time
progressed, Americans began to see the value of the Palmer Act
in ensuring fundamental fairness.33
One of the earliest United States Supreme Court cases
mentioning the concept of change of venue was the case of Cook
v. Burley, 78 U.S. 659 (1867).34 While the case itself does not
center on the issue of change of venue, comments made by the
trial judge regarding the defendant’s concern over an inability
to obtain a fair and impartial trial can be found in dicta.35 The
case involved a land deal in Texas between two parties.36 Both
litigants alleged title to the same plot of land, which was
approximately three-hundred acres in size.37
Shortly before trial, the defendant requested a change of
venue as he felt that he could not receive a fair trial in the
current locale.38 In part, his concern was based on comments
that the trial judge had made in a publication about the
defendant before the start of the trial.39 The Court ultimately

Available at
https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp (last
visited on Oct. 12, 2020)
28 Old Bailey Online, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org (last visited
Oct. 6, 2020).
29 Feldman, supra note 20.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Cook v. Burley, 78 U.S. 659, 660 (1867).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
27
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refused the request, and the denial was later affirmed by the
United Stated Supreme Court.40
Yet, the opinion itself references a March 3, 1821, act
referring to change of venue.41 The act stated:
‘in all suits and actions in any District Court of
the United States in which it shall appear that the
judge of such court is in any way concerned in
interest or has been of counsel for either party,
or is so related or connected with either party as
to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to
sit on the trial of such suit or action, it shall be
his duty, on application of either party, to cause
the fact to be entered on the records of the court,’
and also an order certifying the case for trial42
While the use of venue was clearly focused on judicial
recusal rather than location, the ultimate result was the same
because of a lack of judicial officers. The need for an impartial
magistrate, and therein a fair trial, clearly necessitated a transfer
to a new location.
Article III of the United States Constitution is often
considered the ultimate authority on venue for purposes of
criminal cases.43 The text of the document specifically requires
that an individual be tried for crimes “where said crimes shall
have been committed.”44 It goes on to indicate that, if the locale
of the crime cannot be determined, ultimate authority rests with
Congress to prescribe a location for a trial to occur.45
To further this goal in civil cases, the Federal
Government passed Title 28 of the United States Code Section
1404, which guides changes of venue in civil cases.46 The rule
grants authority to the presiding judge to transfer jurisdiction
of a civil matter to any other “district” or “division” that it may

Id.
Id.
42 Id. at 660-61.
43 U.S.CONST. art. III.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2019).
40
41
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have originally been filed in.47 It further permits, by mutual
consent of the parties, a transfer of location to any venue.48
Under this section of the U.S. Code, the idea of
transferring venue should be based upon the need for a matter
to be resolved justly.49 This can be seen in the case of Emerson
Electric Company v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company, 606
F.2d 234, 241 (8th Cir. 1979).50 The case revolved around a patent
that had been originally issued to a Mr. Ronald Hickman on
October 26, 1971.51 Two years later, Mr. Hickman chose to
assign the patent to a company called Inventec.52 Soon after,
Inventec granted a license to a second company called Limited,
who then provided a sublease to Black and Decker.53 The patent
itself applied to a specific type of workbench originally
invented by Mr. Hickman.54 The product was trademarked as
the “Workmate.”55
In December of 1975, Limited and Inventec filed a
lawsuit against a manufacturing company located in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, by the name of Hempe.56 The lawsuit
arose from an allegation that Hempe was infringing on
Hickman’s original patent by selling a similar product
trademarked the “Porta Bench” to Sears.57 The parties were able
to resolve the matter relatively quickly with a consent
judgment, which initially seemed to put the matter to rest.58
However, approximately three years later in July, 1978, Sears
began to purchase a new type of portable workbench from a
different company called Emerson.59 This product was called
the “Work Buddy.”60

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2019).
28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (2019).
49 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234, 241
(8th Cir. 1979).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 236.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
47
48
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Approximately one month into the relationship,
Inventec sued Sears for patent infringement. The lawsuit was
brought in Federal District Court in Maryland.61 Venue was
chosen because Inventec’s main office, legal counsel, and patent
records were housed in that state.62 Sears was defended by
Emerson because of a contractual agreement between the two
companies.63
In response, Emerson filed its own lawsuit.64 This case
charged Inventec, Limited, Black and Decker, and Hickman as
defendants in an action to declare the initial patent for the
“Workmate” invalid.65 In the alternative, it sought to
distinguish the “Work Buddy” from the “Workmate” so as to
find no patent or trademark violation.66 This subsequent case
was filed in Missouri.67 Similarly to Inventec’s choice to file in
Maryland, venue was chosen based on Emerson’s ties to the
state.68 Emerson then moved for a temporary restraining order
and injunction against proceeding in the Maryland case.69 Black
and Decker responded by requesting that the Missouri case be
stayed until the original lawsuit was resolved or, in the
alternative, transferring the Missouri lawsuit to Maryland.70
Black and Decker cited United States Code Section 1404 as
authority for the court to be able to grant the request.71 The
other defendants in the Missouri case moved to dismiss the case
entirely for lack of personal jurisdiction.72
The trial judge granted the motions to dismiss.73 The
decision was based on the defendants having few if any
contacts to the state of Missouri.74 The judge further granted
Black and Decker’s Motion to Transfer.75 In coming to this
Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
61
62
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conclusion, the court found that Black and Decker had
“sufficient” motives for suing Sears (Emerson) and that
“convenience factors” did not support the Missouri lawsuit.76
Emerson appealed.77
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the appellate court
provided guidance on how venue transfers should occur.78 It
started by expounding on the general federal venue rule.79 This
rule can be found in Title 28 of the United States Code Section
1391.80 The code focuses on the defendant’s ties to the location.81
Section (b) of the states that venue is proper so long as “all
defendants” are residents of the locale.82 Venue can also rest in
a place where the actions that necessitated the lawsuit occur.83
Corporations are found to have residency if their “principal
place of business” is in a specific district.84
The Emerson court ultimately sided with Black and
Decker because, as a defendant, it could have originally been
sued in Maryland because of its ties to the state.85 In reaching
its decision, the Eighth Circuit noted that it was not Emerson’s
ties to the venue that mattered as the plaintiff but Black and
Decker’s ties as the defendant that were germane. “What counts
under s 1391 is that the Defendant here, B&D (Black and
Decker), could have been sued in Maryland.”86 There was no
other appropriate outcome but to permit the transfer.
Emerson clearly illustrates one of the most fundamental
principles as it comes to venue in civil cases. Venue is a
protection for defendants in lawsuits. This concept directly
relates back to the concern our forefathers had when forming
our country; that was that they specifically did not want
Americans to be tried in a difficult locale which could prevent
citizens in any way from being able to exercise their rights due

Id.
Id.
78 Id. at 238.
79 Id.
80 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1979).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 240.
86 Id.
76
77
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to inconvenience or hardship.87 If a party was going to sue
someone, it had to occur in a venue that provided the defendant
the utmost chance of being able to avail themselves of the
abilities needed to defend the lawsuit appropriately.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 provides further
guidance regarding this idea in criminal cases.88 It reads,
“[u]nless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the
government must prosecute an offense in a district where the
offense was committed.”89 The rationale for the rule is provided
within the text of the document itself.90 Specifically, Congress
requires such a venue restriction for the ease of the defendant,
victims, or other witnesses in the matter.91 However, if the court
concludes that a “great” prejudice against the defendant exists,
a change of venue may occur.92 Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 21, a judge must grant a transfer if the defendant is
unable to obtain a fair and impartial jury in the location where
a case is to be tried.93
Interestingly, it was not until 1944 that such an
exception was created.94 According to the committee notes for
the 1944 amendments to the rule, most lawyers did not know
that there was no authority to change venue based upon bias in
the jury composition.95
‘Lawyers not thoroughly familiar with Federal
practice are somewhat astounded to learn that
they may not move for a change of venue, even
if they are able to demonstrate that public feeling
in the vicinity of the crime may render
impossible a fair and impartial trial. This seems

Available at
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/colonialcomplaints-u-s-founding-fathers-wanted-activist-government/ (last
visited on Oct. 12, 2020).
88 Fed. R. Crim. P. 18.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (2020).
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 advisory committee’s note (1944).
87
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to be a defect in the federal law, which the
proposed rules would cure.’96

But in 1970, the Supreme Court of the United States
proclaimed the importance of an unbiased venue in the case of
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).97 In Groppi, the Court
considered a Wisconsin law that prevented a change of venue
request made by a defendant in all misdemeanor level cases
even if an unbiased jury in the case could not be selected.98
Father Groppi was a Catholic priest who had participated in a
form of civil disobedience during a protest.99 He was officially
charged by law enforcement with resisting arrest.100
Eventually, his case was tried before a jury in Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin.101 However, this was over the objection of
the defendant who moved to change venue arguing an
impartial jury could not be selected.102 In his motion, Father
Gruppi’s attorney asked the court to take judicial notice of “‘the
massive coverage by all news media in this community of the
activities of this defendant.’”103 The trial court denied the
objection, finding that change of venue requests for
misdemeanors were strictly forbidden under Wisconsin law.104
The statute in question was Wisconsin Statute Section
956.03. Subsection 3 of the statute read:
If a defendant who is charged with a felony files
his affidavit that an impartial trial cannot be had
in the county, the court may change the venue of
the action to (any county where an impartial trial
can be had). Only one change may be granted
under this subsection.105

Homer Cummings, 29 A.B.A. JOUR. 655; Medalie, 4 Lawyers Guild
R. (3)1, 5.
97 Groppi v. Wis., 400 U.S. 505, 512 (1971).
98 Id. at 506.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 WIS. STAT. SECT. 956.03(3) (1967).
96
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As the statute specifically applied to defendants
charged with “felonies,” the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the request.106 In
reaching this conclusion, the Wisconsin court discerned that it
would be rather unusual for a jury pool to have preconceived
notions about a defendant in a misdemeanor case as the stakes
were so low for such a crime.107 It also believed that other
safeguards were in place to get a fair trial, such as continuances
and strikes to improper jurors.108
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed and
found the statute invalid.109 In making this decision, the Court
emphasized the importance of a citizen’s right to a fair trial
provided in the Sixth Amendment and enforced in state
prosecutions by the Fourteenth Amendment.110 In writing the
opinion, the justices relied heavily on a case the Court had
encountered ten years prior.111 There, an Indiana death row
inmate challenged his conviction and sentence through a
habeas corpus petition.112 He argued that his second change of
venue request was improperly denied because the new venue
was still composed of biased jurors because the publicity
surrounding the crimes bled into neighboring counties.113 His
request was denied because the Indiana statute permitted only
one change of venue request not two.114 However, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the statute finding that the
constitutional right to a fair trial trumps the requirement to be
tried in the location where the crime occurred.115 While it may
be inconvenient or burdensome to the prosecution and
witnesses, “the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the
minimal standards of due process.”116

Groppi, 400 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 507.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 508.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 718 (1961).
113 Id. at 721.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 722.
106
107
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Therefore, in Groppi, the Court faced a similar issue.117
However, instead of a law permitting only one change of venue,
this law permitted no change of venue in minor cases.118 While
the Court agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the
chances of a jury pool being tainted in a misdemeanor trial were
questionable, a defendant must nevertheless be given an
opportunity to show entitlement to change venue no matter the
unlikelihood of bias existing. 119 To fail to do so would, in
essence, rob the defendant of his constitutional right to a jury
trial at all.120
Surprisingly, a review of state laws and cases finds an
acknowledgement of the right to change venue when an
impartial jury cannot be found existing much earlier than
federal court.121 Indeed, one of the first references found stems
from a case arising in 1796 out of the state of Delaware.122 The
rather short opinion describes a case involving reimbursement
for a runaway slave between two parties.123 The defendant cited
two grounds to change the venue of the case from one county
in Delaware to another.124 The state Supreme Court focused its
opinion on only one of the grounds raised on appeal,
specifically centering on an inability to pick an impartial jury.125
In denying the claim, the court ruled that a defendant’s mere
belief that an unbiased venire could not be acquired did not rise
to the level necessary to mandate a change of locale.126 The
judges wrote, “[t]he defendant's belief is not enough, and
beyond that there is little or no ground for the motion.”127
Approximately thirty years later, a case from the state of
Tennessee provided even greater clarity on the early American
view of venue in Ex parte Williams.128 There, the plaintiff sought
the ability to create a road in Smith County, Tennessee.129 The
Groppi, 400 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 506.
119 Id. at 509.
120 Id.
121 Jacobs v. Aydelot, 1 Del. Cas. 411, 411 (1796).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Ex parte Williams, 12 Tenn. 578, 580 (1833).
129 Id. at 579.
117
118
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road would be laid through the property belonging to the
defendant.130 Completely by coincidence, Williams also served
as a circuit judge for Smith County.131 Therefore, by agreement
of the parties, venue was changed to neighboring Wilson
County where Judge Williams ultimately lost his fight to stop
the road’s construction.132 He then appealed to the appellate
court.133
Ruling in favor of Judge Williams, the Supreme Court of
Errors and Appeals for Tennessee focused on the purpose
behind the state’s rule for change of venue.134 The court
referenced state acts that dated back to 1809 which permitted
change of venue in civil cases.135 In reviewing the laws, the court
concluded the acts’ purpose was to ensure that a fair jury panel
could be obtained in the venue where the case would be tried.136
“The sole object of the whole legislation on the subject was to
obtain an impartial jury.”137
In the Williams case, the purpose of the change of venue
was not to get a fair jury but rather to find a judge who was not
a party to the case to handle the matter.138 If, for some reason, a
matter arose where a judge was a party, it fell on him to find
one of his brethren to try the case.139 The stand-in would come
to the county of proper venue and hear the matter.140 Therefore,
the impetus for change of venue statutes, at least in civil
matters, remained to ensure the parties a fair trial.141
State laws providing for change of venue in criminal
matters are supported based on a similar foundation.142 In 1841,
jurisprudence from the state of New York illustrated this
concept in the matter of People v. Webb.143 In that case, the State

Id.
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 579-80.
135 Id. at 579.
136 Id. at 580.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Dula v. State, 16 Tenn. 511, 511 (1835).
143 People v. Webb, 1 Hill 179, 182 (N.Y. 1841).
130
131
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of New York charged a defendant with two counts of libel.144
The charges were originally filed in the county of Ostega.145
However, due to a high amount of publicity surrounding the
circumstances of the crime, a motion was made to change venue
to a neighboring county.146 Interestingly, said motion was made
by the prosecution not the defendant.147
Under New York Law at the time, a change was
permitted if either party could not receive a fair trial because an
impartial jury was unattainable.148 Therefore, the issue in the
Webb case was not if the change of venue could happen but
rather if it could happen when the basis rested solely on an
affidavit provided by one of the parties and not an actual
attempt to obtain an impartial venire.149 The prosecutor
asserted that, “the public mind has become so much prejudiced
against him (the state) in respect to the prosecutions, that a fair
and impartial trial cannot be had in Otsego.”150
In affirming the trial court’s decision to change venue
and have the case tried in a different county, the Supreme Court
of New York looked at the sufficiency of the affidavit alleging
bias rather than the procedure for establishing bias to the
court.151 Unlike previous decision based on speculation, the
prosecutor’s affidavit set out numerous undisputed facts that
provided a basis for a change in location.152 To begin, the
affidavit specified precise information as to how a local
newspaper had sought to undermine the credibility of the
prosecution.153 The prosecution proved that copies of various
articles were delivered to potential jurors before the trial began
to taint them against the state.154 Ultimately, the court
determined:

Id. at 181.
Id.
146 Id. at 181.
147 Id. at 182-82.
148 Id at 182.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
144
145
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As to the weight of evidence, therefore, on which
the motion rests, very little comment would
seem to be necessary.155 The power of the three
presses has been accidentally or purposely
combined to work a prejudice in the public mind
against the complainant, on the very questions
involved in the prosecutions, and in a manner
entirely adequate to the proposed effect.156 The
only options to ensure an impartial jury was to
grant a change of venue request thereby
recognizing that the rate of a fair trial is shared
by all parties to a case.
Thus, a review of the history of venue and motions to
change venue draws some universal concepts. First, venue is
tied to the concept of a jury trial. It is clear from hundreds of
years of jurisprudence as well as our legal roots from English
Common Law that our Constitutional right to a fair trial is
meaningless without honoring the need for an unbiased locale.
Second, the right to an unbiased locale applies to all parties in a
lawsuit. Despite an initial concern for defendants, plaintiffs in
civil cases and the government in criminal cases also enjoy
similar protections. Finally, at the root of a majority of the
concerns surrounding venue is the fear of polluting the jury
pool through peripheral information. No matter the format, as
individuals learn information in different formats, the potential
ways to contaminate a jury pool increase.

III. CHANGE OF VENUE GROUNDS
One need not look far to find case law involving change
of venue requests grounded in coverage by the media. Media
attention could taint a jury in many ways. For instance, the
press can provide information about a case not subject to rules
of evidence or proper court procedure that could influence a
jury’s verdict making it a result of outside information instead
of the facts presented in the courtroom. The news also has the
power to foster sympathy for one side in a lawsuit by
identifying common ground between would be jurors and a
party. Jurors who learn of hardships or obstacles faced by one
155
156
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side may see themselves in the plaintiff or defendant if they
faced similar events in their lives. Lastly, one of the greatest
potential threats the press poses for our legal system is the
creation of a group think mentality. With many stations turning
more to opinion pieces than unbiased reporting, there is an
equal concern that a juror could decide a high-profile case based
on what Rachel Maddow or Sean Hannity tells them.
In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), an example of
a verdict reached by information outside the courtroom can be
found.157 In the case, the defendant, Wilbert Rideau committed
a bank robbery in the town of Lake Charles, Louisiana.158
During the commission of the robbery, he also kidnapped three
bank tellers ultimately causing the death of one of his
hostages.159 Soon after the murder, authorities arrested Rideau
and placed him in the local jail.160
As part of their investigation into the crime, local law
enforcement conducted a jail house interview with the
defendant.161 Investigators both filmed the interview and
recorded audio.162 Eventually, during the twenty-minute
interrogation, Rideau confessed to the robbery, kidnapping,
and murder charges.163 While it is not exactly known how, a few
hours later a local television station broadcasted the interview
to the entire town.164 The next day another broadcast of the
interview launched over the airways.165 Because of high ratings,
the footage ran yet a third time the next day.166 Altogether,
estimates believed that just shy of a hundred-thousand people
saw the report on the news.167 This was for a town of an
estimated population of one-hundred-and-fifty-thousand
citizens.168
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Around two weeks later Mr. Rideau’s attorney moved
to change venue, citing the news report.169 The trial judge
denied the motion and ultimately, at trial, the defendant was
convicted.170 He was sentenced to death for the murder.171 On
appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, appellate attorneys
argued that the request for change of venue should have been
granted. Still, the appellate court confirmed the conviction.172
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the findings
of the lower court and reversed the conviction, ordering a new
trial.173
In reaching a decision, the Justices reviewed portions of
the recorded video televised to the parishioners of the town.174
The United States Supreme Court characterized the film: “What
the people of Calcasieu Parish saw on their television sets was
Rideau, in jail, flanked by the sheriff and two state troopers,
admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, kidnapping,
and murder, in response to leading questions by the sheriff.”175
The Court questioned whether the defendant even knew he was
being recorded but conceded, it was not his idea to make the
production.176 No matter whose idea the film was, the ultimate
effect was the same.177 Through consistent and continued
subjection to the program, the jury pool of the town became
tainted, and the request for a change of venue was required.178
In failing to grant the motion, the trial judge robbed the
defendant of due process.179 The Court considered the entire
trial a “hollow process” infected by a “spectacle” furthered by
a “kangaroo court.”180 In fact, so great was the taint that the
justices concluded a review of the voire dire transcript was
unnecessary as no possible impartial jury could be found in
Lake Charles.181
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One of the most infamous cases about publicity and
change of venue was the trial of Jack Ruby for the murder of
Lee Harvey Oswald.182 The trial centered on the death of
President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent murder of his
alleged assassin.183 Jack Ruby whose real name was Jack
Rubenstein was tried in Dallas, Texas on March 14, 1964.184
Ultimately, Ruby was found guilty and sentenced to death. But
before jury selection, the defense team for Ruby moved for a
change of venue arguing it was impossible to find an impartial
jury in Dallas.185 The trial judge denied the motion which was
brought up on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals for
Texas.186
While the opinion in the case is brief, the concurring
opinion issued by Judge McDonald merits consideration in a
discussion on venue.187 McDonald began his concurrence by
enumerating several potential sources of bias a jury would
encounter in trying Ruby in Dallas.188 For instance, the trial
itself occurred in the same courthouse that the alleged crime,
the murder of Oswald, happened in.189 Furthermore, the
courthouse in general was around a hundred yards from where
President Kennedy had been shot.190 McDonald surmised that
jurors would see the site where Kennedy was murdered “daily”
while coming in to hear the case. In fact, the location was still
being visited by mourners while the trial was occurring.191
Another concern was the guilt that many citizens of
Dallas felt from the death of the president occurring in their
city.192 This shame amplified when the alleged murderer,
Oswald, could no longer be held accountable by a court of law
as Dallas law enforcement officials failed to keep him safe.193
This resulted in the belief in some that Dallas was responsible
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for one of our most beloved Presidents being denied justice for
his untimely and brutal assassination.194 As McDonald wrote:
Dallas was being blamed directly and indirectly
for President Kennedy's assassination and for
allowing the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. The
feeling and thought had been generated that
Dallas County's deprivation of prosecuting
Oswald could find atonement in the prosecution
of Ruby. The writer feels it fair to assume that
the citizenry of Dallas consciously and
subconsciously felt Dallas was on trial and the
Dallas image was uppermost in their minds
to such an extent that Ruby could not be tried
there fairly while the state, nation and world
judged Dallas for the tragic November
events.195
This bias showed in other ways, such as the Dallas local
media writing editorials and reports about Ruby, describing
him as a potential mobster involved with organized crime as
“strip-joint” owner.196 There were even Antisemitic insults
levied against the defendant necessitating the modification of
his name from Rubenstein to Ruby.197 Ruby’s attorneys
bantered about the defense of insanity.198 Yet when brought to
the local hospital for competency testing to stand trial,
administrators refused Ruby entrance to their facility.199
McDonald conceded that finding an impartial jury
anywhere in the country would be a herculean effort.200 The
murders of both the president and Oswald had been televised
multiple time across the airwaves.201 Ultimately, ten members
of the jury who sat in judgment of Ruby saw the video of
Oswald’s death.202 But with the entire city of Dallas invested in
seeking justice for their president, their state, and their city, an
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impartial jury could not be found in that location.203 McDonald
concluded his concurrence by writing, “Against such a
background of unusual and extraordinary invasions of the
expected neutral mental processes of a citizenry from which a
jury is to be chosen, the Dallas County climate was one of such
strong feeling that it was not humanly possible to give Ruby a
fair and impartial trial which is the hallmark of American due
process of law.”204
While Ruby serves as a prime example in which an entire
jury pool can be tainted by a specific act, an even harder case
arises where the potential jury pool consists of similarly
situated individuals to a party in the proceeding. In A. C.
Ferrellgas Corp., Inc. V. Phoenix Insurance Company, 358 P.2d 786
(Kan. 1961), the Kansas Supreme Court encountered this
precise situation.205 In the case, a company sued its insurance
carrier for failing to cover a claim filed due to damage to one of
its buildings.206 The company alleged that the damage had
occurred during a storm due to strong winds.207 The insurance
carrier denied the claim under the guise of arguing the cause of
the loss was flood waters and not wind.208 As there was an
exclusion in the policy for damage caused by flood, there was
no protection under the policy.209
Before trial, the defense moved to change venue to a
neighboring county.210 The basis of the request stemmed from
the argument that the insurer covered several members of the
community and many had filed claims for losses due to the
same storm.211 Even if claims had not been made with this
specific insurance company, the mere fact that potential jurors
had filed claims biased them from serving as an impartial
panel.212 By one account, up to thirteen-hundred claims were
filed from the county in response to the storm.213 The trial court
Id.
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denied the motion and ultimately the insurance company was
ordered to cover the loss.214
In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the request
to change venue, the Kansas Supreme Court looked to the
state’s statutory language regarding venue.215 The text
permitted a switch in location, “when a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had in the county where a case is pending.”216 The
only evidence presented by the defendant that the jury was
biased was its supposition that because so many had suffered
from the same event sympathy must exist for the plaintiff as a
form of common ground or universal bond between members
of the same community.217 The appellate court believed that the
selection process successfully operated through its inherit
safeguards and procedures to weed out such concern and arrive
at a jury who could obtain a verdict based on the evidence
presented, not on outside commiseration brought into the
courthouse.218 The court reminded the defendant that decisions
on venue rest largely in the discretion of the trial judge and
should be disrupted only if the evidence that a fair jury cannot
be found is “readily apparent.”219
Yet an appellate court in New York held the opposite in
a similar case involving dairy farmers that same year.220 In
Althiser v. Richmondville Creamery Company, 13 A.D.2d 162, 215
N.Y.S.2d 122 (1961), the plaintiffs in the lawsuit appealed a
decision to allow a change of venue from the County of
Schoharie, New York.221 The plaintiffs were a group of dairy
farmers who sued the defendant for the difference between the
amounts they received for milk and other dairy products,
versus the amounts they would have received from the
defendant’s competitors.222
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The lawsuit was comprised of one-hundred-twenty-six
different dairy farmers.223 The defense’s contention was that
the pool of potential jurors found in the County of Schoharie
included friends, family, and other dairy ranchers who could
sympathize with the plaintiffs.224 Of note was that the trial court
described Schoharie as a “small rural county.”225 It would
therefore be impossible for an impartial jury to be found in this
location.226
In affirming the lower court transfer of venue, the
appellate court agreed that because of ties through familial
bonds, friendship, or simply a common bond from sharing the
same profession, an impartial jury could not be found.227 The
decision asides any possible jury venire as:
. . . [P]ersons and the members of their families
plus a substantial number of other producers
selling milk to defendants, and ‘in the same
position’ as plaintiffs, and the members of such
other producers’ families, constitute a not
inconsiderable part of the adult population of
the ‘small rural county’ in which the venue was
laid and for which the jury list is of but 1,500
names.228
Yet the appellate court did not stop there.229 It noted that
even those members of the local community who are not
similarly situated to the plaintiffs could still pose concerns as
milk producing was a major economic force in the County of
Schoharie.230 The lawsuit itself centered on loss of funds that
would have ultimately been pumped into the community’s
economy if awarded.231 As a result, a sympathetic jury was
likely during the jury selection process.232 Ultimately, it was not

Id.
Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 123-24.
229 Id. at 124.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
223
224

CHANGE OF VENUE IN COVID-19 “HOT SPOTS”

253

the appellate court’s place to overturn the “sound exercise” of
the trial court’s discretion in granting the request.233
A final example of cases involving venue changes that
merit comment are those situations in which damage awards
could create potential consequences for the individual jurors
themselves. More specifically, if a lawsuit involves suing a local
municipality, could potential payouts demand the raising of
taxes or other fees to compensate the plaintiff which would
ultimately be passed on to the citizenry of the locale. In Hanson
v. Garwood Indus., 279 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1979), the North
Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue in a negligence case
involving the City of Jamestown, North Dakota.234
The case arose from an incident involving a six-year-old
child who was injured when he pulled himself on to the top of
a garbage dumpster.235 The force of his action caused the
dumpster to fall on top of him, harming himself.236 The garbage
container was owned by the City of Jamestown, North Dakota
and had been fabricated by a company called Garwood
Industry.237 The child’s mother sued on behalf of her son both
the city and the company for negligence and strict liability for
their failure to properly maintain the dumpster.238
Before trial, the plaintiff moved to change venue.239 An
affidavit accompanied the pleading in support of the transfer.240
The only basis for the request was grounded in the argument
that should the child succeed in his effort to obtain
compensation for his injuries, the funds to pay said award
would come from taxpayer money.241 Taxpayers were the
potential pool of jurors to hear the case.242 Thus, the plaintiff’s
attorney wrote in the affidavit, “clearly an impartial trial could
not be conducted by jurors who are taxpayers of Defendant city
which might well have to respond in money damages to
Plaintiffs.”243 As a result, the trial court granted the motion and
Id.
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venue was moved from Stutsman County where the City of
Jamestown was seated to Burleigh County.244
The City appealed the transfer noting that as the
defendant’s residence in the case as well as the location of
where the events took place that were the basis of the claim,
venue was proper in Stutsman County.245 In North Dakota, the
law at that time prohibited change of venues unless there was
“reason to believe” that an impartial jury could not be found in
that setting.246 Precedent elaborated that a trial court’s decision
to grant or deny a motion to change venue would be judged by
an abuse of discretion standard.247 But, the burden to establish
that a venue would be unfair rested with the moving party.248
The City’s argument focused on the insufficiency of the
plaintiff’s affidavit to meet the standard that an impartial jury
could not be found in Stutsman County.249 The child asserted
that because the City of Jamestown was in the county and that
the city was largest municipality in that location, logic dictated
that most of the jurors would pay city taxes.250 Yet Jamestown
responded that according to a 1970 census, thirty-five percent
of the residents lived in unincorporated Stutsman County.251
With an estimated population of twenty-three-thousand-fivehundred-and-fifty total residents, there were over eightthousand individuals who could serve on the panel.252
In ruling for the city and reversing the trial court’s
decision, the appellate court reviewed precedent from other
jurisdictions.253 The justices looked to the Alaska Supreme
Court case Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1965),
overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. City of Fairbanks, 583 P.2d
181 (Alaska 1978).254 There too a similar argument was made for
change of venue that a lower court had accepted.255 The Alaska
Supreme Court found the argument lacked merit because it
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would create an automatic requirement that whenever a
municipality was sued its trial could not occur in its home
county.256 This went directly against the foundation behind
why venue is situated where it is situated…to protect the
defendant.257 It also opposed specific guidance provided by the
United States Supreme Court who wrote, “In cases which touch
the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report only.258 There is a
local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home.”259
Yet the North Dakota Supreme Court did not pronounce
a per se rule that similar arguments could not persevere in the
future.260 It noted its own decision in Sheridan County v. Davis,
240 N.W. 867 (1932).261 There, the court found that a change of
venue was proper because the “entire jury” would consist of
taxpayers.262 The situation with the City of Jamestown was
different in that “some” of the potential jurors would be
taxpayers.263 The two decisions were therefore consistent with
each other.264
Indeed, in similar scenarios other courts have concluded
that a change of venue was proper.265 In Florida for example,
the Florida Supreme Court upheld a transfer of venue decision
by a trial judge when a bank requested a change of venue in a
case involving obtaining financial damages as a payee on a local
school board’s note.266 The court held that as taxpayers, the
potential jurors had an adverse interest to the plaintiff’s
success.267 In Berry v. N. Pine Elec. Company, Incorporated, 50
N.W. 2d 117 (Minn. 1951), the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that a trial judge had abused his discretion by failing to order
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venue changed.268 Here, the plaintiff was a child injured by an
electric pole falling on him.269 Most of the residents of the
county where venue was proper were stockholders in the
electric company and therefore would be impacted should a
verdict in favor the child be issued.270 And in the State of
Washington, their Supreme Court held that a lawsuit for
attorney fees against a utility company required venue to be
changed.271 Potential jurors could presume, depending on the
amount of the award, rates would increase to cover the costs.272
This resulted in the would-be venire panel having a contrary
interest to the plaintiff’s success.273
IV. SIMILARITIES TO COVID-19 CASES
In the beginning of this document, the fact that the
coronavirus has not only infected millions of U.S. citizens, but
every aspect of our society became a springboard to a
discussion on change of venue. But the reality of this statement
cannot be overlooked. The author of this article is hard-pressed
to find a single aspect of society that has not potentially forever
been changed by the disease. As lawsuits begin to work their
way through our legal system, will there be a single juror who
has not seen media coverage about the pandemic? Will
attorneys and courts be able to empanel an impartial group who
can sit in judgment of a case that relates in part back to COVID19?
One study launched in May 2020 found a direct
connection between the amount of media consumed by the
public on the topic of the coronavirus and how affected the
home country of those consumers was.274 More specifically, the
worse hit by the virus the more media watched.275 In August,
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Id.
270 Id.
271 Kimball v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Douglas Cty., 391 P.2d 205, 209
(Wash. 1964).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 A Big Data Analysis of Medica Coverage Shines Light on COVID-19-19
Impact, BBVA RESEARCH, https://www.bbva.com/en/a-big-dataanalysis-of-media-coverage-shines-light-on-COVID-19-19-impact/
(last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
275 Id.
268
269

CHANGE OF VENUE IN COVID-19 “HOT SPOTS”

257

the United States became the world leader in virus death
surpassing all other countries.276 As a result, Americans have
become some of the largest consumers of media on the subject
and with it, some of the least impartial individuals on the
planet.
Setting aside media coverage for a moment, case law
shows that a second way venue may be tainted is if a large
proportion of potential jurors from that locale are affected by a
specific incident and that incident somehow plays a role in the
case. Here too, COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on venires
throughout American jurisdictions.277 At first it appeared that
urban areas such as New York and Los Angles would be the
hardest hit areas from the virus.278 Yet over the summer, that
quickly changed.279 Late July and early August saw some of the
highest increases in infection rates and deaths in states like
Missouri, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wyoming, and
Nebraska.280 This trend even prompted a direct warning from
Dr. Deborah Brix, a lead on President Trump’s COVID-19
Taskforce to state on live television, “[t]o everybody who lives
in a rural area, you are not immune or protected from this
virus.”281
No location has been spared from the virus’ effects.
People everywhere have lost jobs, wages, and loved ones from
the disease. Once lawsuits begin making their way through our
legal system, transferring venue from a hard-hit area to a less
Antonia Noori Farzan, Jennifer Hassan, and Rick Noack, Live
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hard-hit area may be impossible. Finding an impartial venue
may become a herculean task if there if there is no locale not
impacted by the disease.
Ultimately, who will bear financially responsibility for
all the losses associated from COVID-19 could also make the
prospect of finding a fair venue impossible. When lockdowns
began, local and state governments led the charge to shutter
businesses to protect public health.282 Those business owners
began fighting back demanding the right to reopen.283 Although
the United States Supreme Court seems to have issued some
case law supporting the states’ right to close such business,
what happens in the future remains to be seen.284 And of course,
just because the Supreme Court may provide some protection
to governments does not mean that concept will protect them
from large jury verdicts by angry citizens in the future.
The possibility of state coffers paying out large awards
is a double-edged sword in the sense that it cuts both ways. The
jury pool could be tainted because, as has been seen in prior
cases, a concern may exist that taxes will be raised to pay these
amounts. That said, on the flip side, jurors angry at their
political leaders for closing business downs because of COVID19 could purposely side with the business owner as payback. In
essence, the potential taint from this concern increases
exponentially.
V. SOLUTIONS
As time progresses in the spread of the illness, the
potential reality exists that there may be no “hot spot” free
venues available to try cases in. If this occurs, then judges and
lawyers need to consider alternative solutions in finding
unbiased venues to try cases. One potential idea is to utilize the
voir dire process to ask more probing questions as to the
Andrew Keshner, Closing Our Business to Stop the Coronavirus
Violated Our Employees’ Rights, Lawsuit Claims, MARKETWATCH
(Mar.30, 2020 at 4:42 p.m.),
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specific effect of COVID-19 on a potential juror. If enough of a
difference exists between their experience with the disease and
the case’s tie to the illness, the likelihood exists that the person
still may be able to hear the case. For example, if a juror lost
their job because of COVID-19 closures, he or she still may be
able to hear a wrongful death case arising out of negligent care
for sickness in a nursing home. Potentially, anger over losing a
job to the disease does not bias someone similarly to losing a
loved one. Yet the importance of probing questions on the part
of the trial attorneys during the jury selection process cannot be
overstated for this idea to succeed.
A second proposal to combat the venue issue could be
reliance on more bench trials where the judge sits as the fact
finder together with their role as law interpreter. If the concern
is that potential jurors could not set aside their biases, then the
hope would be that a single judge could. Understandably,
judges too have been affected by COVID-19. This suggestion is
not to imply that this group has somehow been spared from the
ravages of the disease. Rather, the proposal acknowledges that
judges are trained and duty bound to remain neutral in a case.
Capitalizing on these qualities may better serve parties for the
time being than be tried by a jury of one’s peers.
A third idea could be the development of a specific jury
instruction to address COVID-19 bias. Special jury instructions
are used throughout the litigation process. Criminal lawyers
often see this occur in death penalty cases to help seat a death
qualified jury.285 For that reason, writing guidance for jurors to
recognize potential bias on the topic is not an extraordinary
remedy. The key would be involving lawyers, judges, and those
impacted by the illness during the drafting process to ensure an
adequate remedy.
One final thought would be the potential of wiping the
COVID-19 taint from the case altogether to see if it is relevant
and necessary to the determination of a verdict. Imagine an
argument centered on the idea that the role the illness plays in
a matter is too prejudicial outweighing its probative value. Like
the evidentiary objection found in most venues, a judge could
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erase, if not limit, the mentioning of COVID-19 during the case
in chief thereby erasing if not limiting its effect.286

VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it remains unclear what life after the
pandemic will look like. With courthouses across the country
shuttered, the number of lawsuits waiting to be filed is akin to
a ticking time bomb about to explode. Whether those cases are
heard by a fair and impartial jury from a specific location, at the
moment, seems uncertain. But moving forward it falls to judges
and attorneys to approach the voir dire process in a different
way to root out bias. Inquiries about life during the pandemic
may soon become standard questioning procedure for many
lawyers litigating cases post COVID-19. One thing is certain,
ignoring the subject altogether equates to a failure to provide
adequate legal representation, inviting a reversal on appeal.
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